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Comparison of molecular testing strategies for COVID-19 
control: a mathematical modelling study
Nicholas C Grassly, Margarita Pons-Salort, Edward P K Parker, Peter J White, Neil M Ferguson, on behalf of the Imperial College COVID-19 
Response Team*
Summary
Background WHO has called for increased testing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but countries have taken 
different approaches and the effectiveness of alternative strategies is unknown. We aimed to investigate the potential 
impact of different testing and isolation strategies on transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2).
Methods We developed a mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission based on infectiousness and PCR test 
sensitivity over time since infection. We estimated the reduction in the effective reproduction number (R) achieved by 
testing and isolating symptomatic individuals, regular screening of high-risk groups irrespective of symptoms, and 
quarantine of contacts of laboratory-confirmed cases identified through test-and-trace protocols. The expected 
effectiveness of different testing strategies was defined as the percentage reduction in R. We reviewed data on the 
performance of antibody tests reported by the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics and examined their 
implications for the use of so-called immunity passports.
Findings If all individuals with symptoms compatible with COVID-19 self-isolated and self-isolation was 100% effective 
in reducing onwards transmission, self-isolation of symptomatic individuals would result in a reduction in R of 
47% (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 32–55). PCR testing to identify SARS-CoV-2 infection soon after symptom onset 
could reduce the number of individuals needing to self-isolate, but would also reduce the effectiveness of self-isolation 
(around 10% would be false negatives). Weekly screening of health-care workers and other high-risk groups irrespective 
of symptoms by use of PCR testing is estimated to reduce their contribution to SARS-CoV-2 transmission by 23% 
(95% UI 16–40), on top of reductions achieved by self-isolation following symptoms, assuming results are available at 
24 h. The effectiveness of test and trace depends strongly on coverage and the timeliness of contact tracing, potentially 
reducing R by 26% (95% UI 14–35) on top of reductions achieved by self-isolation following symptoms, if 80% of cases 
and contacts are identified and there is immediate testing following symptom onset and quarantine of contacts within 
24 h. Among currently available antibody tests, performance has been highly variable, with specificity around 90% or 
lower for rapid diagnostic tests and 95–99% for laboratory-based ELISA and chemiluminescent assays.
Interpretation Molecular testing can play an important role in prevention of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, especially 
among health-care workers and other high-risk groups, but no single strategy will reduce R below 1 at current levels 
of population immunity. Immunity passports based on antibody tests or tests for infection face substantial technical, 
legal, and ethical challenges.
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Introduction
Different countries have taken very different approaches 
to molecular testing in response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The observation that countries with high 
rates of testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection have effectively 
controlled transmission (eg, South Korea and Germany) 
has led to calls for increased testing in other countries 
with lower rates of testing (eg, the UK and the USA). 
However, the contribution of testing to COVID-19 
control compared with other interventions such as self-
isolation and physical distancing is currently unclear.
There is a clear priority to test patients with suspected 
COVID-19 in hospital to inform treatment and infection 
control strategies, and to monitor the extent of the 
pandemic. As testing capacity increases, the role of wider 
testing in different risk groups should be determined, 
not only to monitor the pandemic but also to prevent 
transmission by isolating infected individuals. Targets 
for testing could include health-care and social-care 
workers, care home resi dents, other high-risk groups, or 
the general population.
Health-care workers have been disproportionately 
affected by COVID-19, constituting between 5% and 
19% of all reported COVID-19 cases in European 
countries (eg, from 5·1% in the UK1 to 19% in Spain2). 
This high incidence (six-fold higher than in the general 
population in the UK3) reflects their exposure to 
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SARS-CoV-2 infection from patients and fellow staff. 
Infection in health-care workers can contribute to 
nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2, and similar concerns 
apply to transmission among care home staff and others 
working with vulnerable populations. Regular screening 
of these high-risk groups for infection, in addition to 
routine testing of those with COVID-19 symptoms, could 
identify individuals with mild or asymptomatic infection 
and reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission if they self-isolate.
Testing could also contribute to prevention of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission in the general population. It might 
promote adhe rence to self-isolation by individuals showing 
COVID-19 symptoms who test positive. It is also the basis 
of test-and-trace interventions, which in volve tracing and 
quarantining contacts of laboratory-confirmed cases.
Mathematical models can be used to evaluate the 
potential effectiveness of different testing strategies. 
A small number of modelling studies have examined the 
role of regular screening in the general population or 
health-care workers and the role of testing during 
contact tracing.4–7 However, these studies have assumed 
100% accuracy of available tests or that testing simply 
increases the rate at which infected individuals are 
isolated.
We aimed to investigate the potential impact on 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission of alternative strategies for 
deploying PCR tests that identify active infection and 
antibody tests that indicate past infection. We developed 
a mathematical model of transmission to estimate the 
effectiveness of strategies aimed at health-care workers, 
other high-risk groups, and the general population, 
including regular testing irrespective of symptoms and 
test-and-trace strategies. We also explored the concept 
of so-called immunity passports, which have been 
proposed as an approach to certify individuals with 
evidence of past infection or acquired immunity as safe 
to return to work where there may be risk of exposure 
to SARS-CoV-2. We focus on the UK, but our results 
are relevant for policy decisions made by other 
countries.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
Evidence on the performance of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) tests has been 
accumulating, and our understanding of COVID-19 
epidemiology has been evolving rapidly, with much of the 
scientific evidence still only available as preprints rather than 
peer-reviewed publications. We therefore searched PubMed 
and the medRxiv preprint server (using the R package medrxivr) 
using the search term “(SARS or COVID or coronavirus) and 
test* and model and math*” on June 1, 2020, for papers 
published or uploaded in 2020. The search returned 
20 publications and 43 preprints, from which we identified 
11 studies that used mathematical modelling to evaluate the 
role of testing in COVID-19 control, including two preprints 
missed by the search but known to the authors. Two studies 
examined regular screening of health-care workers for 
infection, one considered the effectiveness of test-and-trace 
strategies (assuming 100% test sensitivity), three studies 
examined universal mass testing (irrespective of symptoms), 
and six modelled increased testing simply as an increase in the 
rate at which infections were detected and isolated. 
Model results were often divergent, reflecting different 
assumptions about SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology and testing 
capacity. Weekly screening of health-care workers was 
estimated to prevent between 5% and 24% of transmission 
from this group, test and trace reduced the reproduction 
number (R) for SARS-CoV-2 transmission between 
15% and 50% depending on coverage and timeliness of test 
results, and estimates for the effectiveness of universal mass 
testing varied, from a 2% reduction in R to a 40% reduction in 
epidemic size, depending on coverage and frequency. Very few 
studies considered test performance (sensitivity and specificity) 
and only one study considered more than one testing strategy.
Added value of this study
Our study evaluates the optimal use of available 
SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid and antibody tests for prevention of 
transmission. We developed a mathematical framework 
describing infectiousness and test sensitivity over time since 
infection to estimate the effectiveness of alternative 
strategies, including regular screening of high-risk groups 
such as health-care and social-care workers and the 
effectiveness and efficiency of test-and-trace protocols. 
We integrated current evidence for the sensitivity and 
specificity of available tests alongside epidemiological data 
about the proportion of asymptomatic infections and the 
contribution of individuals with asymptomatic and 
presymptomatic infections to transmission. We did sensitivity 
analyses to determine the robustness of our results and 
considered the implications of our findings for national 
testing policies.
Implications of all the available evidence
Testing can play an important role in the prevention of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission, in addition to its established use 
for pandemic surveillance and confirmation of a COVID-19 
diagnosis. Optimal strategies should include regular screening 
of high-risk groups such as health-care and social-care workers 
during periods of sustained transmission, and testing 
of people with COVID-19 symptoms and tracing and 
quarantining their contacts. Test and trace requires high 
coverage (proportion of cases tested and contacts successfully 
traced and quarantined) and rapid testing and contact tracing 
to be effective. Testing alone is unlikely to bring R below 1 at 
current levels of immunity and will need to be complemented 
by other interventions such as physical distancing.
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Methods
Mathematical model
We developed a mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 
trans mission, describing infectiousness over time since 
infection based on observed serial intervals.8 We used this 
model to evaluate the impact of self-isolation following 
either a positive test result or symptom onset, and the 
impact of quarantine of contacts of laboratory-confirmed 
cases. We assumed a proportion of infections are asymp-
tomatic and that individuals who are asympto matic might 
have lower infectiousness than those with symptomatic 
infections. We derived formulae for the effective repro-
duction number (R), defined as the average number of 
secondary infections from a single infected individual, in 
a population with testing of individuals with sympto matic 
infection only, screening of all individuals irres pective of 
symptoms, and test and trace, where contacts of labo-
ratory-confirmed cases are quarantined. We calculated 
the expected effective ness of different testing strategies, 
defined as the percentage reduction in R. We did sensi-
tivity analyses of these model estimates to uncertainty in 
model parameters using bivariate plots and Latin 
Hypercube Sampling from model parameters with 
1000 replicates to generate 95% uncertainty intervals 
(95% UIs). The model is described in detail in the 
appendix (pp 2–4) and the full code is online.
Model parameters and data
We obtained a best estimate and plausible range for model 
parameters describing the natural history and trans mission 
characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 from the published literature 
(appendix p 5). These included the proportion of infections 
that are asymp tomatic and their relative infectiousness, the 
mean serial interval in the absence of self-isolation, 
the incubation period distribution, and PCR test sensitivity 
over time since infection. We generated an estimate of the 
PCR test sensitivity from three published meta-analyses 
of data collected after symptom onset and an assumption 
that presymptomatic sensitivity was proportional to in-
fectiousness (appendix p 6).9–11 Specificity of PCR was 
assumed to be 100% on the basis of the performance of the 
majority of available tests reported by the Foundation for 
Innovative New Diagnostics.12 We extracted data on the 
sensitivity and specificity of IgG (or IgG plus either IgM or 
IgA) antibody tests based on tests of samples from 
PCR-positive COVID-19 cases in the same Foundation 
for Innovative New Diagnostics database accessed on 
June 3, 2020.12 We used these data to determine the positive 
predictive value of a positive antibody test that might be 
used to issue an immunity passport.
Role of the funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The corresponding author had full access to all 
the data in the study and had final responsibility for the 
decision to submit for publication.
Results
If individuals self-isolate following onset of symptoms of 
COVID-19 (cough or fever or loss of smell or taste) then 
their contribution to SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the 
community will be reduced (figure 1A). The overall 
reduction in R in a population that undergoes symptom-
based self-isolation will depend on the proportion 
of infections that are asymptomatic and their relative 
infectiousness compared with sympto matic infections. 
Current estimates indicate that approximately 33% 
(range 20–50) of infections are asymptomatic, and 
asymptomatic infections have a relative infectiousness of 
about 50% (range 10–100; appendix p 5). If all individuals 
with symptoms compatible with COVID-19 self-isolated 
and there was no further transmission from self-isolating 
individuals, this would result in a reduction in R of 
47% (95% UI 32–55; figure 1C). The effectiveness of self-
isolation also depends on the extent of presymptomatic 
transmission. Increasing the median serial interval from 
6 days to 8 days (in the absence of self-isolation) decreases 
the proportion of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from pre-
symptomatic individuals (from 42% to 26%) and results 
in a corres ponding increase in the effectiveness of self-
isolation following symptom onset from 47% to 60%. The 
effective ness of self-isolation also scales linearly with 
compliance and the ability of self-isolating individuals to 
restrict transmission to other household members (eg, if 
self-isolation meant SARS-CoV-2 transmission was only 
reduced by 50% after symptom onset, R would be reduced 
by 23% instead of 47%).
PCR testing of symptomatic individuals to identify 
SARS-CoV-2 infection would reduce the number of 
individuals needing to self-isolate. However, it would 
also reduce the effectiveness of self-isolation because 
some test results would be false negatives. If samples 
were collected close to the time of symptom onset and 
test results were made available rapidly (eg, within 
24 h), then the proportion of false-negative results 
would be relatively low (around 10%) on the basis of the 
reported PCR test sensitivity, and most symptomatic 
individuals could safely return to work once well. For 
example, with a 1% prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection, 
a single negative test would have a greater than 
99% probability of being correct (negative predictive 
value). A negative test would also release any quaran-
tined household members who might be required to 
stay at home (eg, in the UK, cohabitants of someone 
with COVID-19 symptoms currently need to quarantine 
for 14 days).
Regular PCR testing of high-risk groups such as 
health-care or social-care workers for SARS-CoV-2 
infection, irrespective of symptoms, could further 
reduce trans mission if asymptomatic or presymptomatic 
infections are identified and isolated (figure 1A, B). The 
effectiveness of this strategy depends on the frequency 
of testing, timeliness of results, and sensitivity of the test 
as a function of time since infection. For our best 
For the full code see https://
github.com/grassly/covid-
testing-strategies
See Online for appendix
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estimate of test sensitivity (appendix p 6), weekly 
screening of health-care workers and a 24 h delay from 
testing to self-isolation would reduce their contribution 
to SARS-CoV-2 trans mission (R) by 23% on top of any 
reductions already achieved as a result of self-isolation 
following symptoms (figure 1D). If tests were to be done 
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Figure 1: Infectiousness of SARS-CoV-2 over time since infection estimated from the serial interval and the reduction of transmission as a result of self-isolation after symptoms or a 
PCR-positive test result
(A) Detection of presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection and subsequent reduction in transmission through self-isolation after a positive PCR test. (B) Detection of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 
infection and subsequent reduction in transmission through self-isolation after a positive PCR test. The shaded areas in these plots illustrate infectiousness that would be limited by PCR testing 
(grey) at 4 days after infection or self-isolation following symptom onset (red) at 6 days after infection. The area under the curves is equal to the reproduction number. (C) Percentage reduction in 
the reproduction number by self-isolation following onset of symptoms as a function of the proportion of infections that are asymptomatic and their relative infectiousness compared with 
symptomatic infections. (D) Additional percentage reduction in the reproduction number by a policy of repeated PCR testing at regular intervals with different timeliness from sample 
collection to isolation, assuming a third of infections are asymptomatic and that they are 50% as infectious as symptomatic infections. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2.
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at the end of a shift and results made available before 
the next shift, then the time delay between testing 
and isolation would effectively be zero, increasing the 
effectiveness of PCR testing to 32% (depending on 
exposure during time off).
The effectiveness of regular screening also depends on 
the proportion of infections that are asymptomatic and 
their relative infectiousness as well as the median serial 
interval (in the absence of self-isolation; appendix p 7). 
Accounting for uncertainty in these parameters by use of 
Latin Hypercube Sampling gives a 95% UI of 16–40 for 
the effectiveness of weekly screening with a 24 h delay 
and 24–50 when there is no delay. Lower test sensitivity 
reduces the effectiveness of regular screening. For 
example, a 15% reduction in test sensitivity reduces 
the effectiveness of weekly screening from 23% 
(95% UI 16–40) to 19% (13–35; appendix p 7).
Quarantining the contacts of symptomatic individuals 
who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 has the potential 
to prevent transmission from both symptomatic and 
asympto matic infected contacts. The effectiveness of 
this test-and-trace strategy is strongly dependent on 
the proportion of symptomatic individuals who are 
tested (u), the success in tracing their contacts (v), and the 
timeliness of obtaining test results and identifying and 
quarantining contacts. If we assume the coverage of test 
and trace is 80% (u=v=80%) and that it takes 24 h from 
sample collection to quarantine of contacts, then the 
reduction in the number of secondary infections from 
contacts of the index case is 26% (95% UI 14–35; figure 2A). 
If symptomatic contacts are also eligible for contact tracing, 
then this reduction is approximately equal to the overall 
reduction in R (see appendix pp 2–4 for further details). 
The combined impact of quarantine of contacts and self-
isolation of symptomatic individuals is therefore a 61% 
reduction (95% UI 44–77) in R for these parameter values. 
On average, quarantine of contacts would occur 3·5 days 
after they became infected (or 2·5 days if there was no delay 
from sample collection to quarantine). For 50% coverage 
and a 48 h delay to quarantine, the reduction in trans-
mission is just 8% (95% UI 5–11). Uncertainty intervals 
account for uncertainty in the proportion of infections that 
are asymptomatic and their relative infectiousness, 
the median serial interval, and test sensitivity (see 
appendix p 8 for further details). We assume sample 
collection for testing is done at symptom onset. 
Later testing will further reduce the effectiveness of this 
strategy.
Contact tracing could be done on the basis of symp-
toms alone, rather than waiting for a test result. This 
approach would modestly increase the reduction in 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission by avoiding false-negative test 
results and could facilitate more rapid quarantine of 
contacts. For example, if all symptomatic individuals 
were eligible for contact tracing (equivalent to 100% test 
sensitivity) and the delay to quarantine was just 12 h, the 
Figure 2: Effectiveness of test-and-trace strategies as a function of the time from test to quarantine of contacts and coverage
Coverage is defined as the proportion of symptomatic infections identified for contact tracing and the proportion of contacts successfully traced, assumed equal in these plots. The percentage 
reduction in the reproduction number of contacts for test-and-trace strategies (A) or test-trace-test strategies (B), assuming self-isolation on the basis of symptoms is already in place. 
This reduction is approximately equal to the reduction in the overall reproduction number if contacts who develop COVID-19 symptoms are also eligible to be an index case for further 
contact tracing.
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reduction in transmission would increase from 26% 
to 31%.
To avoid quarantine of large numbers of individuals 
when the incidence of infection is high, testing of contacts 
could be done and only those who test positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 infection put into isolation. The effective -
ness of such a test-trace-test strategy is sub stantially lower 
than than of test and trace because of the high probability 
of false-negative results among contacts tested early in 
their infection (figure 2B). In fact, a 48–72 h delay in 
identifying and testing contacts is more effective than just 
a 24 h delay because the probability of a false-negative 
result decreases. At 80% coverage and with a 48 h delay in 
tracing and testing, the reduction in transmission from 
this strategy is 10% (95% UI –2 to 21), whereas with 
50% coverage it is just 4% (–7 to 15). Negative effectiveness 
results from the release of sympto matic index cases from 
isolation following a false-negative test result.
Antibody tests need to have high specificity to avoid 
false-positive results that would undermine the value of 
an antibody-based immunity passport. The performance 
of currently available tests compared with the standard 
required to provide a greater than 95% positive predictive 
value when prevalence is arbitrarily set at 5% or 25% is 
shown in figure 3. The specificity of antibody testing is 
around 90% or lower for rapid diagnostic tests but higher 
(eg, 95–99%) for laboratory-based ELISA and chemi-
luminescent assays.
Discussion
As testing capacity increases, it is crucial that we use 
available SARS-CoV-2 tests not only to monitor the 
pandemic but also to directly contribute to the prevention 
of transmission. We estimate that weekly screening 
of health-care workers for infection through PCR 
testing would reduce their contribution to SARS-CoV-2 
transmission by around one quarter on top of any 
reductions already achieved by self-isolation following 
onset of symptoms. The effectiveness of this strategy 
depends on the extent of transmission from pre sympto-
matic and asymptomatic infected individuals and the 
timeliness of test results. Recent data from three UK 
hospitals that screened their staff found a prevalence of 
SARS-CoV-2 infection during April, 2020, of 2–3% in 
approximately 2000 health-care workers, all of whom 
were asymptomatic at the time of testing.13–15 In 
London, UK, data from March indicated a substantially 
higher prevalence of 7·1% (28 of 396) in the week of 
March 23,15 while seroprevalence in health-care workers 
in Birmingham, UK, on April 24, was 24·4% (126 of 516).14 
It remains unclear how many of these infections were 
acquired from patients or from other health-care workers, 
although a high prevalence among staff who had no 
interaction with patients with COVID-19 in these studies 
suggests substantial transmission between health-care 
workers. More generally, nosocomial transmission has 
been an important feature of the pan demic, with UK data 
suggesting around 20% of patients admitted to hospital 
for COVID-19 acquired their infection in a hospital.4 Tests 
in residential care homes done during the same period 
also found a high prevalence of asymptomatic infection 
among staff.16 These and other groups with a high 
transmission risk and with frequent person-to-person 
contact, such as cashiers or teachers, might also therefore 
benefit from regular PCR testing during times of high 
SARS-CoV-2 incidence.
Detection of infected staff through regular screening 
or symptomatic testing also allows subsequent contact 
Figure 3: Sensitivity and specificity of currently available antibody tests
The circles indicate the reported test performance for different test platforms, with the size of the circle 
proportional to the total number of control samples tested and the colour indicating the test format. The lines 
indicate thresholds for test performance required to provide a 95% probability of correctly predicting the presence 
of antibodies (positive predictive value) for a prevalence of 5% (black line) or 25% (grey line) among those tested. 
Tests to the left of these lines meet this performance standard, although further clinical sample testing is required 
to confirm their specificity. The x-axis shows 1-specificity plotted with a square root transform to better show the 
high specificity threshold required. Only tests for IgG, or IgG plus either IgM or IgA, are included. Data are from the 
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics.12
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tracing at the workplace and implementation of infection 
control measures. Regular screening can also be comple-
mented by mask wearing and other hygiene practices in 
communal areas where personal protective equipment 
would not typically be worn.
The number of tests required for regular screening 
of health-care workers will depend on the planned 
coverage. In England in 2019, there were around 
35 000 National Health Service (NHS) staff working in 
intensive care, infectious disease, or respiratory medicine.17 
Weekly testing of this group would require 5000 daily tests, 
considerably lower than the UK target of 200 000 daily tests 
by the end of May, 2020. Of course, NHS staff exposed to 
COVID-19 include other specialties and roles, and there 
has been considerable reassignment of NHS staff to care 
for patients with COVID-19, making the number at risk 
who would benefit from testing difficult to determine but 
likely to be considerably greater than 35 000.
Extending regular PCR screening, irrespective of 
symptoms, to the general population would be logistically 
impossible and inefficient.6 Instead, a test-and-trace 
strategy based on testing of symptomatic individuals and 
tracing the contacts of those with laboratory-confirmed 
SARS-CoV-2 infection is more appropriate. However, 
we estimate this strategy would at best prevent about 
26% (95% UI 14–35) of transmission compared with 
self-isolation based on symptoms alone, depending on 
the extent of asymptomatic transmission, assuming 
80% of symptomatic infections are reported, 80% of 
their contacts are traced and effectively quarantined (no 
onwards transmission), and that testing is done on the day 
of symptom onset with just a 24 h delay to test results and 
quarantine of contacts. The combined effectiveness of self-
isolation based on symptoms (47% reduction in R) and a 
test-and-trace strategy (26% reduction in R) would be a 
61% reduction in R based on these assumptions and our 
best estimates of the prevalence of asymptomatic infection 
and its contribution to SARS-CoV-2 trans mission. If R in 
the absence of these interventions is greater than 2·5, as 
estimated for most European countries at the start of the 
pandemic and probably still the case given the relatively 
low prevalence of immunity (<10%), this strategy would be 
insufficient to achieve R lower than 1.18
A less ambitious test-and-trace approach or one with 
limited compliance would have a much smaller impact 
on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. For example, the pro-
bability of successful contact tracing depends on the 
ability to identify and follow-up contacts. However, 
contacts at risk of infection might be difficult to identify 
and could include not only direct interactions but also 
use of shared resources or spaces within a certain time 
period. Compliance with quarantine measures will 
depend on the level of trust in the government, individual 
perception of risk, economic incentives and disincentives, 
and the ability to impose quarantine on individuals. In 
the case of mobile phone applications (apps) for contact 
tracing, their effectiveness will depend on uptake of the 
app and the proportion of the population with a suitable 
mobile phone. It is quite possible that these consi-
derations would result in low coverage (reporting of 
symptoms and identification of contacts) and limited 
effectiveness of test and trace.
There are also concerns about the speed with which 
cases can be detected and their contacts quarantined. In 
China, early in the epidemic the mean time from 
symptom onset to isolation of index cases was 4·6 days 
compared with 2·7 days for symptomatic contacts.19 
Thus, although contact tracing reduced the time to 
isolation of infected individuals by 1·9 days, self-isolation 
began on average more than a week after infection, 
which would lead to minimal reduction in SARS-CoV-2 
transmission according to our model (corresponding to a 
delay from test to trace and quarantine of about 5·5 days, 
since without a delay we expect quarantine of contacts on 
average 2·5 days after infection).
Contact tracing on the basis of symptoms alone is 
predicted to result in a modest increase in effectiveness 
compared with test and trace, assuming a similar pro-
portion of contacts are quarantined. However, this 
strategy would result in unnecessary quarantine for a 
large number of people, particularly during the winter 
when respiratory viruses causing symptoms compatible 
with COVID-19 (eg, fever and cough) are common.20 Test 
and trace would result in fewer contacts requiring 
quarantine, although the number could still be sub-
stantial. For example, during the first week of test and 
trace implementation in England when incidence was 
relatively low (May 28 to June 3, 2020), 5407 (67%) of 
8117 people testing positive had their contacts traced, 
with 26 985 contacts asked to quarantine themselves for 
14 days.21 Testing of contacts and releasing those who test 
negative from quarantine would decrease the number in 
quarantine, but this approach substantially reduces 
the effectiveness of test and trace because of the high 
probability of false-negative test results in the first 3 days 
of infection.
Confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection through PCR 
testing could be used to confer an immunity passport on 
the basis of evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection following 
self-isolation. Among those not tested by PCR, antib ody 
testing at least 3–4 weeks after symptom onset could be 
used instead to determine immune status to SARS-CoV-2. 
It has been proposed that individuals with detectable 
antibodies could return to work, including to high-risk 
roles where exposure to infection is likely to be greatest. 
They could also be exempt from the need to self-isolate if 
a household member develops COVID-19 symptoms. 
However, there are a number of technical, logistic, and 
ethical challenges to the implementation of immunity 
passports. The first relates to the specificity of antibody 
testing. Poor specificity will result in non-immune 
individuals receiving an immunity passport and being 
potentially put at risk of infection. Conversely, using tests 
with poor sensitivity would compromise the effectiveness 
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of the scheme and would result in individuals with 
acquired immunity being ineligible for an immunity 
passport. Sensitivity depends not only on the quality of 
the particular test, but also on antibody titre, which is 
lower following mild illness and in children and young 
adults than in older individuals.22
A second challenge for immunity passports is whether 
detectable antibody or PCR evidence of infection indicate 
protection against COVID-19, and if so, for how long. 
The initial rise in antibody titre 1–2 weeks after symptom 
onset is associated with clearance of SARS-CoV-2 
infection, and passive transfer of antibodies from con-
valescent sera has been reported to improve outcomes in 
non-randomised trials.23,24 However, the effectiveness and 
duration of pro tection against sub sequent exposure is 
unknown, parti cularly against heterologous strains 
where weak cross-neutralising antibodies could result in 
en hanced patho logy.25 Finally, there are concerns that the 
economic and personal benefits of an immunity passport 
to the general popul ation would lead to fraud, and imple-
mentation of such a scheme is likely to face serious legal 
and ethical challenges related to discrimination based 
on immune status. Perhaps, instead of an immunity 
passport con ferring specific privileges, evidence of 
immunity could be used by individuals to assess their 
COVID-19 risk and make their own informed decisions, 
particularly as our under standing of immunity to 
SARS-CoV-2 improves and assays become more reliable. 
Once vacci nes become available, evidence of immunity is 
likely to be replaced by evidence of immunisation, with 
most (but not all) countries unlikely to discriminate on 
the basis of immune status.
There are limitations to our analysis, most notably the 
continued uncertainty around the contribution of 
asymptomatic infections to SARS-CoV-2 transmission, 
which we have addressed through the sensitivity analysis. 
Data on the implementation and impact of test-and-trace 
strategies and on the contribution of health-care workers 
to nosocomial transmission are also needed. As these 
strategies are adopted in the UK and more widely, it is 
important to collect high-quality data to improve models 
and investigate further refinements to testing strategies.
It is clear that PCR and antibody testing are required 
for surveillance of the COVID-19 pandemic and will play 
an important role in informing the lifting or re-imposing 
of various components of physical distancing inter-
ventions by allowing accurate estimates of R and 
identifying the extent of transmission. They can also play 
a direct role in prevention of SARS-CoV-2 trans mission, 
with effectiveness strongly dependent on coverage and 
speed to results. Now is the time to invest in testing 
capacity, policy, and planning to maximise their con-
tribution to the fight against COVID-19.
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